Does the EU Sugar Policy Reform Increase Added Sugar Consumption? An Empirical Evidence on the Soft Drink Market by Bonnet, Céline & Réquillart, Vincent
 10-197 
October, 2010 
Does the EU Sugar Policy Reform 
Increase added Sugar 
Consumption? An Empirical 
Evidence on the Soft Drink Market 
CÉLINE BONNET AND VINCENT RÉQUILLART 
Research Group: Food, Farms and Firms 
Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar
consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market.
Céline Bonnet and Vincent Requillarty
October 2010z
Abstract
National Health authorities recommend a decrease in the consumption of addedsugar. At the
same moment, a reform of the Common Organisation of the Sugar Market will lead to a decrease by
more than 30% of the sugar price in the EU. Using French data on the soft drinks purchases, this
paper investigates the impact of this reform on the consumption of sugar sweetened beverages and
on added sugar consumption. The soft drink market is composed of highly di¤erentiated products
with di¤erent sugar content. Hence the reform of the EU sugar policy leads to a decrease in regular
soft drink prices by more than 3% in average and varies from 1.7% to 6.5% according to the brand.
To assess substitution within the food category of sugar sweetened beverages, we use a structural
econometric model, the random-coe¢ cients logit model. Our model also takes into account observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in the consumersbehavior and then allows to estimate the impact of
the sugar price decrease on the soft drink consumption according to the type of consumers. Results
suggest that price changes would lead to an increase in market shares of regular products by 7.5% and
a decrease in market share of diet products by 3.5%. On the whole, it would rise the consumption of
regular soft drinks by more that 1 liter per year and per person and the consumption of added sugar
by 124 grams per year and per person. Moreover, the reform leads to substitution between brands
at the benet of products with the highest sugar content. The increase in per person consumption is
larger in households composed of overweight and obese individuals.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Schroeter et al. (2008) concluded that a relative e¢ cient intervention (to combat
obesity in the US) is to apply a tax on caloric soft drinks. An on-going reform of the sugar policy in
the EU is going to reduce the EU price of caloric sweeteners by 36%. As sugar is the main variable
input of the soft drink industry, the reform is the exact opposite of this recommendation. In this paper,
we investigate the impact of the EU sugar policy reform on soft drink consumption and added sugar
consumption, and discuss its likely e¤ects on obesity.
In almost every developped countries, obesity rates have signicantly increased over the last decades
(Sassi et al., 2009). This is mainly due to a decrease in the price of food calories combined with an
increase in the cost of burning calories (Cutler et al., 2003). These price changes favoured an increase
in calories intake and a decrease in calories utilisation which nally led to a weight increase.1 Because
obesity is now thought as a major public health problem, public actions are developped in order to combat
obesity rise. Till now, they mainly rely on information campaigns while pricing policies are discussed but
are rarely put in place (Mazzochi et al., 2009). Because food prices do depend on agricultural product
prices, there is also a debate about the role of agricultural policies on the rise in obesity. For example,
Lloyd-William et al. (2008) concluded that the EU agricultural policy led to a signicant increase in
cardiovascular mortality as the policy favoured the consumption of saturated fats. However, there exist
some controversies about the impact of agricultural policies certainly because distorsions created by
agricultural policies vary signicantly across products (see for example Alston et al., 2006).
Over the last 20 years, sugar price in the European Union (EU) was well above the world market
price. A combination of price oor, import duties, export subsidies and quotas were used to sustain the
domestic price (European Commission, 2004). Moreover due to restrictive quota, High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) did not substitute for sugar in the EU as it was the case in the US where the sugar
policy also maintained high prices for sugar.2 Thus in the EU the price of caloric sweeteners were high
1Other elements might explain the rise in obesity in the population such as a higher share of olders in the population
but it seems that the main ingredient is the change in prices and cost of using calories.
2For an analysis of competition between sugar and HFCS in the EU, see Cooper et al. (1995). For an analysis of the
USsweetener market, see Beghin et al. (2003).
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as compared to other countries. The past sugar policy did not favoured sugar consumption in the EU.
However, in February 2006 a reform of the EU sugar policy was agreed (Union Européenne, 2006). The
reform will lead to a signicant decrease in the EU sugar price. The reference price, which roughly acts
as a oor price, will be reduced by 36% over a 4-year period starting in 2006.3 This reform is at odds
of what would be recommended by nutritionnists or public health authorities. For example, one of the
objective of the french Programme National Nutrition Santéis to decrease by 25% the consumption of
added sugar (Ministère de la Santé et des Solidarités, 2006).
Therefore, while the health policy has set an ambitious objective of reduction of added sugar intake in
the french population, the reform of the sugar policy in the EU will lead to a signicant decrease in the
price of sugar. If transmitted to the price of nal sweet products, the decrease in the sugar price might
induce an increase in their consumption which could be detrimental for health. Thus, some empirical
studies have focused on the relationship between food consumption and obesity and suggest that policies
which increase the price of calories may provide useful tools to reduce caloric intake and therefore to
reduce the prevalence of obesity (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Ransley et al., 2003; Schroeter et al.,
2008; Bonnet et al., 2009).
In the food and health economics literature most analysis of tax policies use a system of demand
equations on broad food categories. Each equation species the demand for a food category as a function
of its own price, the price of other food categories, and other variables (Chouinard et al., 2007; Smed et
al., 2007; Leicester and Windmeijer, 2004, Marshall, 2000; Allais et al., 2010; Etile, 2010; Bonnet et al.,
2009). These models do not allow for substitutions within a food category while it is composed of highly
di¤erentiated products with di¤erent nutrient content that consumers substitute.4 Estimating demand for
di¤erentiated products with common demand models is nontrivial given the large number of parameters
3The reference price for white sugar is 631.9e/t from 1 July 2006 to 30 September 2008. It is 541.5e/t from 1 October
2008 to 30 September 2009 and it is 404.4e/t after 1 October 2009. As a comparison, in 2007, the average world market
price of sugar was about 310e/t. In April 2010, the average price of sugar in the EU was 477 e/t while it was 636 e/t in
2006 which represents a 25% decrease. (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/minco/manco/cmo/index.htm)
4Whatever the coverage of the study, from the analysis of a complete demand system as in Bonnet et al. (2009) or Allais
et al. (2010) to the analysis of a more specic market as in Chouinard et al. 2007 on dairy products where they distinguish
about 10 dairy products distinguishing between skimmed milk and non-skimmed milk, products within a category are
assumed to be identical.
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to be estimated. Moreover, these models do not allow for heterogeneity in consumer tastes and it is
likely that preferences for products are not homogeneous across consumers. To tackle both problems, we
propose to estimate a random coe¢ cients logit model that solves the problem of the number of parameters
to be estimated by projecting products onto a space of characteristics (McFadden, 1973) and allows to
introduce heterogeneous preferences of consumers. Futhermore, the estimation method developped by
Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000) allows to solve the endogeneity problem of prices. Indeed, prices are
correlated with the error term of demand equations as unobserved characteristics included in the error
term might be correlated with prices (e.g. advertising, promotions).
In this paper, we intend to assess the impact of the sugar price decrease on the Soft Drink consump-
tion in France taking into account the heterogeneity of supply in the sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs)
industry. We choose this industry for three reasons. First, there is strong evidence that consumption of
SSBs is a contributor to the epidemicof obesity (Harnack et al., 1999). Thus, in a systematic review of
the impact of SSBs intake on weight gain, Malik et al. (2006) concluded by the following: "the weight of
epidemiologic and experimental evidence indicates that a greater consumption of SSBs is associated with
weight gain and obesity. Although more research is needed, su¢ cient evidence exists for public health
strategies to discourage consumption of sugary drinks as part of a healthy lifestyle".5 Any decrease in the
price of SSBs would thus leads to an increase in their consumption which might have a negative impact
on health. Second, according to AFSSA (2009), SSBs are the main contributor in caloric sweeteners for
children (19.1%) and the third one for adults (13.3%). Third, sugar is an important input in this industry
as the sugar content of SSBs ranges from 6% to 11%. Moreover, sugar costs range from 7 to 24% of the
nal price of SSBs. The anticipated 36% decrease in the price of sugar might have signicant impact on
SSBs prices.
This paper uses a structural econometric model that allows to account for the heterogeneity in con-
sumerspreferences with respect to the di¤erent brands available and in particular according to demo-
5One possible explanation of the physiological mechanism involved is the following: consumption of sugar-sweetened
drinks could lead to obesity because of imprecise and incomplete compensation for energy consumed in liquid form(Ludwig
et al., 2001; see also Malik et al., 2006). There is some controversy whether HFCS is more detrimental than sugar (see for
example Melanson et al., 2007). However this does not signicantly change the general conclusion that SSBs are a major
contributor to the epidemic of obesity.
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graphic characteristics such as the proportion of overweight and obese individuals in a household. Hence,
we will be able to account for di¤erent responses to price changes according to obesity status of house-
holds. We will also be able to distinguish di¤erent price changes as the sugar content of brands di¤ers.
Our results suggest that the larger the proportion of overweight and obese individuals in a household,
the less sensitive to change in prices consumers are. This implies that a decrease of SSBs prices would
have a larger impact on the percent change in consumption of households with thinindividuals. How-
ever, the consumption of households with obese people might increase more due to their initial higher
consumption. The reform of the EU sugar policy might lead to a decrease in regular SSBs prices by 3.4%
in average and from 1.7% to 6.5% depending on the brand. The sugar price decrease would lead to an
increase of market shares by 7.5% for regular products and a decrease by 3.5% for diet products. This
would imply an increase in the regular soft drink consumption of 1.3 liter per person and per year and an
increase in added sugar consumption of 124 grams per year and per person. Depending on the weight
statusof the household, the average increase in per person consumption varies from 1.1 to 1.4 liters of
Soft Drinks and from 116 to 141 grams of added sugar. The analysis also shows that the brands with the
highest sugar content increase their market share in a larger proportion. The reform thus increases soft
drink consumption but also induces a shift in favour of the products with the highest sugar content. This
latter result fully justies the use of a demand model with di¤erentiated products to capture substitutions
between products with di¤erent sugar content.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main characteristics of the soft drinks market.
Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics about soft drink consumption. Section 4 describes
the demand model that allows to assess own and cross-price elasticities. In section 5 we discuss demand
results as well as the impact of the sugar policy reform. Finally we conclude in section 6.
2 The Soft Drinks market
Soft drinks represent about 11% of the total beverages consumption in France which include mineral
water, alcohol, co¤ee, tea, drinking milk as well as fruit juices (Canadean, 2004 ). In average, soft
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drinks consumption increased by 32% from 1994 to 2004.6 Nevertheless, the per capita consumption
in France (42.5 liters per year) remains small as compared to the per capita consumption in the EU
(71.2 liters in average). Market analysts frequently distinguish carbonated soft drinks or sodas colas,
tonics, carbonated fruit drinks, lemonade and uncarbonated soft drinks  iced tea, fruits drinks. In
France, carbonated soft drinks represent 78.5% of the market and uncarbonated soft drinks 21.5% in
2004. The three main categories are colas (54% of all soft drinks), fruit drinks (25% for both carbonated
and non carbonated products) and iced tea (8%). Soft drinks do not include fruit juices and nectars
which represent a signicant part of beverage consumption. Those products do not contain a signicant
proportion of added sugar and they are thus not directly concerned by the change in sugar price.7 In our
analysis, they are included in the outsideoption for consumers as they are substitute of soft drinks.
In general, there are two versions of each soft drink: a regular one which is sweetened using caloric
sweeteners, almost exclusively sugar in France, and a diet one which is sweetened using non-caloric
sweeteners such as aspartame or acesulfame. The two main ingredients of regular soft drinks are water
(about 90%) and sweetener (about 10%). The main ingredient of a diet soft drink is water (99.7%).
Obviously, soft drinks also contain food additives such as food coloring, articial avoring, emulsiers
and preservatives.
3 Data
We use data from a consumer panel data collected by TNS WordPanel. We have a french representative
survey of 19,000 households over a three years period (2003-2005). This survey provides information on
purchases of food products (quantity, price, brand, characteristics of goods, store) and on characteristics
of households (income, number of children and adults, weight and height of each person, ...).
According to our sample, the average total consumption of regular soft drinks per year and per person
is lower when households have no overweight and obese individuals. Indeed, consumption amounts to
6Note that the consumption of diet drinks increased by 224% from 1994 to 2004. Nevertheless, their market share is still
lower than 20%.
7Fruit juices do not contain added sugar while nectar contains less than 6% of added sugar.
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32 liters per year and per person in those households while it is 34 liters for households where some
individuals are overweight or obese.8 When all members of the household are overweight or obese, the
consumption rise to 37 liters per year and per person and 41 liters if all members are obese.
From the panel data, we select the 11 main national brands (NB) of the soft drink industry and
three private labels (PL), one for each of the three categories of products (colas, iced tea, fruit drinks).
We select the nine largest retailers in France. Taking into account the set of products distributed by
each retailer we get 105 (or 104 depending on the period) di¤erentiated products which compete on the
market.9
Market shares are dened as follows. The relevant market is the whole market of SSBs including soft
drinks, fruit juice and nectar. Then, market share of a given brand in a given retailer is dened as the
ratio of the sum of purchases of the brand in the selected retailer during a period of four weeks and the
sum of purchases of all brands in all retailers in the relevant market during the same period. In this
setting, the outside option (which represents 66% of the whole market) is composed of two elements:
purchases of fruit juice and nectar (40% of the market) on the one hand and purchases of non selected
soft drinks or non selected retailers on the other hand.10
Table I: General Descriptive Statistics for Prices and Market Shares
Prices (in euros per liter) Market Shares
Mean (std) Mean in %
Outside Good 66.2
Soft Drinks 0.82 (0.25) 33.8
Regular products 0.78 (0.26) 80.8
Diet products 0.92 (0.16) 19.2
National brands 0.93 (0.153) 73.1
Private labels 0.47 (0.13) 26.9
Selected soft drinks account for 33.8% of the whole market (Table I). The average price over products
and periods is 0.82 euros per liter. Regular products dominate the market as they represent about 80%
8These gures are lower than the gure previously cited in section 2 because they only consider at home consumption.
9From the consumer perspective, a product is the combination of a brand and a retailer. We account for this precise
di¤erentiation because prices di¤er by retailer. Moreover, the sugar content of private labels also varies across retailers.
10We exclude 77 brands as well as 66 retailers or distribution channels. All those only represent 27% of the market.
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of soft drinks purchases; their prices are 15% lower than those of diet products. PLs hold about 27% of
the market of soft drinks and are sold at about half of the price of NBs. Those products also di¤er by
their sugar content (Figure 1). Indeed, the sugar content is 0 for diet products and varies from 56 to
110g per liter for regular brands.
Figure 1: Distribution of sugar content of soft Drink products
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4 The Demand Model: a random-coe¢ cients logit model
To get price elasticities of demand for every di¤erentiated product we need a demand model as exible as
possible and thus opt for a random-coe¢ cients logit model (Berry et al., 1995; McFadden and Train, 2000).
This model is based on a random utility specication that takes into account the observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in consumerspreferences. Moreover, this discrete choice model allows to account for the
product di¤erentiation in an easy way since it allows to project the large number of products on a space
of characteristics (McFadden, 1973).
The indirect utility funtion Vijt for the consumer i buying the product j at period t is given by
Vijt = j + t   ipjt + ilj + jt + "ijt
where j are product xed e¤ects which capture the (time invariant) unobserved product charac-
teristics, t are time xed e¤ects (dummies) which capture time demand shocks, pjt is the price of the
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product j at period t and i the marginal disutility of price for consumer i, lj is a dummy related to an
observed product characteristic (which takes 1 if the product j is a diet product and 0 otherwise) and
i captures consumer is taste for the diet characteristic, jt captures the unobserved variation in the
product characteristics and "ijt is an unobserved individual-specic error term.
We assume that i and i vary across consumers. Indeed, consumers may have a di¤erent price
disutility or di¤erent tastes for the diet characteristic. We assume their distributions are independent
and parameters have the following specication:
i
i

=




+ Di + vi
where Di is a d 1 vector of demographics and vi = (vi ; vi )0 a 2x1 vector which captures the unob-
served consumers characteristics.  is a 2d matrix of coe¢ cients that measure the taste characteristics
through demographics and  is a 2  2 diagonal matrix of parameters (; ) that measure the unob-
served heterogeneity of consumers. We suppose that Pv(:) is a parametric distribution of vi, PD(:) is a
non parametric distribution known from data and Di and vi are independant. This specication allows
demographics to a¤ect taste characteristics, reducing the reliance on parametric assumptions.
We can break down the indirect utility in a mean utility jt = j + t + pjt + lj + jt and a
deviation to this mean utility ijt = [pjt; lj ] (v

i + Di; v

i + Di)
0
: The indirect utility is given
by Vijt = jt + ijt + "ijt:
The consumer may decide not to choose one of the products considered. Thus, we introduce an outside
option allowing for substitution between the considered products and a substitute. The utility of this
outside good is normalized to zero. The indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Vi0t = "i0t.
Assuming that "ijt is independently and identically distributed like an extreme value type I distri-
bution, we are able to write the market share of product j at period t in the following way (Nevo,
2001):
sjt =
Z
Ajt
 
exp(jt + ijt)
1 +
PJt
k=1 exp(kt + ikt)
!
dP()dPD(D) (1)
where Ajt is the set of consumers who have the highest utility for product j at period t, a consumer
is dened by the vector (Di; i; "i0t; :::; "iJt). We assume that the distribution P follows an independant
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bivariate normal distribution with means  and  and standard deviations  and  of vi and v

i
respectiveley.
The random-coe¢ cients logit model generates a exible pattern of substitutions between products
driven by the di¤erent consumer price disutilities i. Thus, the own and cross-price elasticities of the
market share sjt can be written as:
@sjt
@pkt
pkt
sjt
=
(
 pjtsjt
R
isijt(1  sijt) (vi)dvi if j = k
pkt
sjt
R
isijtsikt (vi)dvi otherwise:
(2)
5 Results
In this section, we present and discuss demand results as well as the results of the policy simulation.
5.1 Demand results
We estimate the random coe¢ cients logit model using the well-known GMM method proposed by Berry
et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000, 2001). This method requires the use of a set of instruments to solve
the endogeneity problem of prices. We use input price indexes of wages, plastic, aluminium, sugar and
gazole as it is unlikely that input prices are correlated with unobserved demand determinants.11 These
variables are interacted with manufacturers dummies because we expect that manufacturers obtain from
suppliers di¤erent prices for raw materials and the quality of plastic and aluminium may changed over
manufacturers.
Table II shows results of the demand model estimates by GMM accounting for consumer heterogene-
ity in the sensitivity of price and the taste of observed product characteristics.12 First, note that the
overidentifying restriction test is not rejected meaning that instruments are valid. On average, the price
has a signicant and negative impact on utility. The proportion of overweight and obese individuals in
a household a¤ects positively the price coe¢ cient meaning that these households are less price sensitive.
Proportion of obese in the household does not signicantly inuence the price sentivity of households.
Futhermore, the coe¢ cient of the dummy identifying diet products is negative on average meaning that
11These indexes are from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
12This estimation was realized with 500 draws for the parametric distribution representing the unobserved consumer
characteristics and the nonparametric distribution of consumer demographics.
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consumers do not like this characteristic. However, the standard deviation is large meaning that some
consumers like diet products and some others do not like them. The proportion of overweight and
obese individuals and the proportion of obese individuals have no impact on the coe¢ cient of the diet
characteristic.
Table II: Results for the random coe¢ cients logit model
Coe¢ cients (Std. error) Mean Standard Deviation
Price -8.55 (1.57) 2.52 (0.95)
Proportion of overweight and obese people 6.50 (1.92)
Proportion of obese people -6.32 (7.02)
Diet -0.72 (0.08) 2.20 (0.86)
Proportion of overweight and obese people 2.72 (2.63)
Proportion of obese people 4.93 (3.71)
Coe¢ cients j ; t not shown
Overidentifying Restriction Test (df) 26.11 (17)
From the structural demand estimates, we are able to compute own and cross-price elasticities for
each di¤erentiated products (Table III).13 Own-price elasticities of demand for a brand vary between
-2.92 and -4.37 and is -3.93 on average. Our results suggest that demand for regular products is slightly
less elastic than demand for diet products (diet products are brands 2, 4, 6 and 9). Thus, own-price
elasticity of demand for regular brands is about -3.87 while it is about -4.08 for diet brands, these means
are statistically di¤erent. Finally, PL demand is less price elastic than NB demand. Same magnitude of
own-price elasticities are obtained by other studies on the soft drink markets in the US, specially if one
takes into account the way brands are dened. Obviously, price elasticity of demand for a productdoes
depend on the denition of the product. A priori, the more brands are distinguished in the analysis the
higher the elasticity of a single brand. Thus, Gasmi et al. (1992) estimated own-price elasticities to -2 for
Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. For the Carbonated Soft Drink US market, Dhar et al. (2005) distinguished
4 brands and found own-price elasticities between -2 and -4. On the same market, but using a higher
level of disagregation (about 20 brands), Dubé (2005) found elasticities ranging from -3 to -614 .
13To built this table we compute the elasticities of brands within each retailer and we report the average over the di¤erent
retailers of each elasticity and overtime.
14Unfortunately, according to our knowledge, there is no other study on the French soft drink market.
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The analysis of cross-price elasticities among products in a given retailer reveals that substitutions
are mainly among products with similar sugar prole, that is regular products (that is sweetened with
caloric sweeteners) substitute with other regular products rather than with a diet product. Conversely,
diet products substitute more with the other diet products than they do with regular products. The
taste category (cola, ice tea, fruit drinks) does not seem to play a signicant role in the substitutions as
substitution within a taste category are not larger than between categories.
Finally, we are able to compute the own price elasticities for households with di¤erent demographic
characteristics. As a consequence of the positive coe¢ cient of price for the proportion of overweight and
obese people in an household, we nd average own price elasticities varying from -5.49 to -3.14 when
the proportion of overweight and obese individuals in the household increases. Then, household with
overweight and obese people will react less to a change in the price of brand. The decrease of regular
product prices in response to the foreseen decrease in sugar price is likely to induce a larger (in percent)
increase in the consumption of soft drink by household without overweight and obese people than by
household with .
Table III: Own and Cross Price Elasticities between Brands within the same Retailer
B ra n d 1 B ra n d 2 B ra n d 3 B ra n d 4 B ra n d 5 B ra n d 6 B ra n d 7 B ra n d 8 B ra n d 9 B ra n d 1 0 B ra n d 1 1 B ra n d 1 2 B ra n d 1 3 B ra n d 1 4
S u g a r R D R D R D R R D R R R R R
C a t e g . 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 3
B r a n d 1 -4 .2 0 7 8 0 .0 0 2 9 0 .0 0 4 4 0 .0 0 1 9 0 .0 0 4 0 0 .0 0 1 6 0 .0 0 4 1 0 .0 0 3 8 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 4 5 0 .0 0 4 4 0 .0 0 6 3 0 .0 0 6 2 0 .0 0 6 2
B r a n d 2 0 .0 0 4 9 - 4 .3 6 7 6 0 .0 0 4 3 0 .0 3 5 8 0 .0 0 3 9 0 .0 2 6 8 0 .0 0 4 0 0 .0 0 3 7 0 .0 2 8 9 0 .0 0 4 3 0 .0 0 4 3 0 .0 0 4 7 0 .0 0 4 6 0 .0 0 4 6
B r a n d 3 0 .1 3 0 3 0 .0 5 3 1 - 4 .1 9 6 1 0 .0 5 6 3 0 .1 2 7 4 0 .0 5 2 4 0 .1 2 9 1 0 .1 2 1 7 0 .0 5 4 5 0 .1 3 3 9 0 .1 3 3 6 0 .0 9 6 5 0 .1 1 3 2 0 .1 0 8 4
B r a n d 4 0 .0 3 4 8 0 .2 7 9 1 0 .0 3 6 1 - 4 .0 7 3 9 0 .0 3 5 2 0 .1 9 5 8 0 .0 3 5 6 0 .0 3 4 4 0 .2 0 8 4 0 .0 3 5 8 0 .0 3 6 0 0 .0 2 6 1 0 .0 2 9 8 0 .0 2 8 8
B r a n d 5 0 .0 1 6 1 0 .0 0 6 6 0 .0 1 7 3 0 .0 0 7 4 - 4 .0 7 2 0 0 .0 0 7 2 0 .0 1 7 5 0 .0 1 7 0 0 .0 0 7 5 0 .0 1 7 2 0 .0 1 7 3 0 .0 1 0 3 0 .0 1 3 0 0 .0 1 1 9
B r a n d 6 0 .0 0 2 2 0 .0 1 4 7 0 .0 0 2 4 0 .0 1 3 8 0 .0 0 2 5 - 3 .8 1 6 6 0 .0 0 2 5 0 .0 0 2 5 0 .0 1 2 6 0 .0 0 2 4 0 .0 0 2 4 0 .0 0 1 4 0 .0 0 1 8 0 .0 0 1 6
B r a n d 7 0 .0 1 5 5 0 .0 0 6 3 0 .0 1 6 6 0 .0 0 7 1 0 .0 1 6 5 0 .0 0 6 8 - 4 .0 9 6 0 0 .0 1 6 1 0 .0 0 7 1 0 .0 1 6 5 0 .0 1 6 6 0 .0 1 0 2 0 .0 1 2 8 0 .0 1 1 8
B r a n d 8 0 .0 1 5 0 0 .0 0 6 1 0 .0 1 6 4 0 .0 0 7 2 0 .0 1 6 8 0 .0 0 7 1 0 .0 1 6 9 - 3 .8 6 8 7 0 .0 0 7 3 0 .0 1 6 3 0 .0 1 6 5 0 .0 0 9 0 0 .0 1 1 7 0 .0 1 0 6
B r a n d 9 0 .0 0 7 4 0 .0 5 0 7 0 .0 0 7 9 0 .0 4 6 5 0 .0 0 8 1 0 .0 3 9 8 0 .0 0 8 2 0 .0 0 8 1 - 4 .0 2 2 2 0 .0 0 7 9 0 .0 0 8 0 0 .0 0 4 9 0 .0 0 5 9 0 .0 0 5 5
B r a n d 1 0 0 .0 1 7 1 0 .0 0 7 0 0 .0 1 7 6 0 .0 0 7 3 0 .0 1 6 5 0 .0 0 6 8 0 .0 1 6 7 0 .0 1 5 8 0 .0 0 7 1 - 4 .3 0 2 8 0 .0 1 7 4 0 .0 1 3 2 0 .0 1 5 0 0 .0 1 4 3
B r a n d 1 1 0 .0 1 0 1 0 .0 0 4 1 0 .0 1 0 5 0 .0 0 4 4 0 .0 1 0 0 0 .0 0 4 1 0 .0 1 0 1 0 .0 0 9 6 0 .0 0 4 3 0 .0 1 0 4 - 4 .2 7 6 2 0 .0 0 7 2 0 .0 0 8 7 0 .0 0 8 2
B r a n d 1 2 0 .0 1 1 2 0 .0 0 5 2 0 .0 0 5 4 0 .0 0 2 3 0 .0 0 4 0 0 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0 4 4 0 .0 0 3 7 0 .0 0 1 9 0 .0 0 5 4 0 .0 0 5 2 - 2 .9 2 4 3 0 .0 1 1 9 0 .0 1 1 9
B r a n d 1 3 0 .0 0 8 4 0 .0 0 3 7 0 .0 0 6 3 0 .0 0 2 6 0 .0 0 5 3 0 .0 0 2 1 0 .0 0 5 5 0 .0 0 4 8 0 .0 0 2 3 0 .0 0 6 3 0 .0 0 6 2 0 .0 0 9 6 - 3 .6 3 5 6 0 .0 0 9 1
B r a n d 1 4 0 .0 1 8 4 0 .0 0 8 1 0 .0 1 4 6 0 .0 0 6 0 0 .0 1 1 9 0 .0 0 4 8 0 .0 1 2 5 0 .0 1 0 8 0 .0 0 5 2 0 .0 1 4 7 0 .0 1 4 2 0 .0 1 9 9 0 .0 1 9 0 - 3 .4 8 8 4
R m e a n s r e g u la r ; D m e a n s d ie t
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5.2 Simulation of the sugar policy reform
In line with the anticipated impact of the reform of the EU sugar policy, we simulate a 36% decrease in
the sugar price. Using the sugar content of each product, we calculate the decrease in cost due to the price
cut of sugar. In average, the decrease of sugar price generates a decrease in the production cost of 2 e
cents for regular products. Depending on the sugar content, the decrease varies from 1.79 to 2.68 e cents
(see Table IV). Assuming a full transmission of the production cost decrease to the nal price, consumer
prices of regular products decrease by more than 3.4% in average. Price changes are heterogenous (from
-1.7% to -6.5%) as both cost reduction and initial prices are di¤erent among products. In particular, as
PLs are priced about 50% lower than NBs, the percent decrease in PL price is higher.
5.2.1 Impact on market shares
Decrease in prices of regular products lead to an increase in the aggregate market share of regular products
by 7.5%. This is due to substitution with diet products (whose market share decreases by 3.5%) as well
as with the outside option (whose market share decreases by 3%).15 We nd that changes in market
share are very heterogeneous across brands (Table IV). Private labels as well as brands 1 and 3 manage
to get the larger increases. This result suggests that taking into account the di¤erentiation of products
in a food category is important. In particular, it is interesting to note that among NBs it is brands with
the highest sugar content which increase most their market share. PLs also increase signicantly their
market shares. In average they have a lower sugar content but their composition is not homogenous as
PLs are di¤erent from one retailer to another one. It is also worth noting that when market share are
evaluated in points (rather than in %) it is brand 3 which increases most its market share. Brand 3 has
a highsugar content. Thus, not only there is substitution between regular and diet products but also
among regular products there is substitution at the benet of products with the highest sugar content.
15 It should be acknowledged that the price of the outside option is assumed to be unchanged which is a limit in the
analysis. However, a signicant part of the goods in the outside option will not be a¤ected by the decrease in the sugar
price as those goods do not contain any added sugar.
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Table IV: Simulation of a decrease by one third decrease of the sugar price
Sugar Content Change in cost Change in price Change in MS Change in MS
(in grams per liter) (e cents) (%) (points) (%)
Mean (std) Mean (std) Mean (std) Mean (std) Mean (std)
Brand 1 110 (.) 2.68 (0.05) -3.69 (0.50) +0.09 (0.01) 10.25 (1.85)
Brand 2    -0.03 (0.01) -3.74 (0.50)
Brand 3 103 (.) 2.58 (0.05) -2.94 (0.16) +0.77 (0.06) 7.32 (0.93)
Brand 4    -0.15 (0.02) -3.59 (0.50)
Brand 5 73.6 (0.36) 1.79 (0.12) -1.73 (0.14) 0.02 (0.01) 1.93 (0.73)
Brand 6    -0.01 (0.00) -3.12 (0.72)
Brand 7 90 (.) 2.19 (0.04) -2.16 (0.23) 0.04 (0.01) 3.77 (1.05)
Brand 8 105 (.) 2.55 (0.05) -2.28 (0.16) 0.05 (0.01) 4.23 (0.92)
Brand 9    -0.03 (0.01) -3.34 (0.56)
Brand 10 92 (.) 2.24 (0.04) -2.61 (0.21) 0.08 (0.02) 5.73 (0.94)
Brand 11 102 (.) 2.48 (0.05) -2.75 (0.25) 0.05 (0.01) 6.43 (1.30)
Brand 12 95 (15) 2.32 (0.39) -6.55 (2.00) 0.52 (0.04) 14.60 (4.30)
Brand 13 76 (27) 1.86 (0.07) -3.69 (1.00) 0.17 (0.04) 7.78 (1.58)
Brand 14 89 (59) 2.16 (0.15) -4.52 (0.83) 0.45 (0.06) 10.84 (1.63)
5.2.2 Impact on households
Thanks to the demand estimate which takes into account di¤erent price sensitivities according to the
obesity status of the household, we are able to recover the change in the average consumption of di¤erent
groups of households. Table V provides the increase in average consumption of regular and diet products
as well as the increase in the consumption of added sugar for 3 groups of households.
The average consumption of regular products increases by 1.16 liters while the average consumption
of diet products remains roughly identical. Consumption of added sugar would raise by 124 grams per
person and per year. However, the presence of overweight or obese individuals in the household plays a
role. For households where less than half of the members are overweight and obese, the increase is about
1.3 liters of regular soft drinks and 141 grams of added sugar, which are statistically di¤erent from the
results of an average household.
We estimated the increase in added sugar consumption using two methods. The rst one takes into
account the true sugar content of each brand (fth column). The second one assumes an average sugar
content (sixth column). The rst estimate is in average 5% higher than the second (from 4% to 6%
depending on households). Thus anything else constant (in particular the change in market share of each
brand), the substitution in favour of brands with a high content of sugar increases by 5% the change in
14
added sugar consumption.
Table V: Change in consumption for di¤erent groups of households (liter or gram/person/year)
Percentage of Proportion of Regular Soft Drinks Diet Soft Drinks Added Sugar Added Sugar
overweight and households Mean (std) Mean (std) Di¤erentiated (1) Average(2)
obese households (%) (l/p/year) (l/p/year) (g/p/year) (g/p/year)
No 44 1.19 (0.06) -0.00 (0.00) 116 112
less than half 35 1.42 (0.08) -0.03 (0.01) 141 133
More than half 21 1.16 (0.10) -0.47 (0.06) 116 109
Total Population 100 1.16 (0.07) -0.11 (0.01) 124 118
(1): Taking into account the sugar content of each brand (2) Using an average content
6 Conclusion
The reform of the EU sugar policy reform will induce a signicant decrease in the price of sugar. This
reform is at odds of what is recommended by health authorities which in order to combat obesity call
for a decrease in the consumption of added sugar. To anticipate the impact of the sugar policy reform
on added sugar consumption we focused our analysis on a specic sector, the soft drink industry which
is frequently denunciated as a signicant contributor to the obesity problem. We argue that such impact
analysis should take into account the existence of numerous and highly di¤erentiated products in the
food market. Using a very exible demand model, we are able to simulate the impact on soft drink
consumption of the recent EU reform of the sugar market. Our results suggest that 1) the decrease
by 36% of the sugar price might induce an increase in the consumption of regular soft drinks by 7.5%
while the consumption of diet products would be slightly reduced 2) the decrease in sugar price not only
increases the aggregate market share of regular soft drinks but it also favors products with the highest
sugar content; the increase in added sugar consumption is thus due to the increase in consumption of soft
drinks and to the substitution between brands in favor of the most sweetened. 3) the larger the proportion
of overweight and obese individuals in a household, the less sensitive to change in prices consumers are;
as households with a higher proportion of overweight and obese people have a larger initial consumption
of soft drinks, the change in consumption among households is less variable than the initial consumption.
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In this analysis we have considered that cost reduction is fully transmitted to consumer prices. This
implicitly assumes marginal cost pricing through the vertical chain. Depending on how costs changes
are transmitted to the nal prices, this might lead to over or under estimate the impact of the reform.
In France, Campa and Golberg (2006) showed that the retail price transmission is greater than 1 in
the food retailing industry. According to this result, assuming a 1 to 1 cost price transmission leads to
underestimate the impact of the reform.
The quantitative changes in sugar consumption might be considered as small or even neglictible. We
argue it is not the case for two reasons. First, it should be acknowledged that the SSB consumption in
France is lower than in Europe. For example, the SSBs consumption in UK is larger than 100 l/person/year
which is 2.5 times the consumption in France. As the sugar policy reform apply to all EU countries, in
countries like UK, the impact on sugar added consumption is likely to be signicantly higher. Second
the refom of the sugar policy will a¤ect all sweet products market while here we focused on a specic
market. Then the impact on consumption of added sugar is likely to be larger. In any case, from a health
perspective, the reform goes in the wrong direction.
Finally, if one considers that SSBs plays a signicant role on the epidemic of obesity, our results
suggest that taxing SSBs could help combatting obesity. Thus, consumption reacts signicantly to prices.
Our results also suggest that the tax should be set in relation to the sugar content in order to avoid
substitution in favor of products with high sugar contents.
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